In the context of: radios use in Oregon standoff; 3% communications guru Sparks31 abdication; and Ncscouts’ Echoes of Chechnya inspiration.
Links to look at:
http://radiofreeq.wordpress.com/2016/01/19/militia-radio-frequencies/ / https://archive.is/KclMO
http://sparks31signalcorps.wordpress.com/2016/01/17/closing-down/ / https://archive.is/Umwhh
http://brushbeater.wordpress.com/2015/12/01/echoes-of-chechnya/ / https://archive.is/yTPUH
http://citizenmilitem.com/?page_id=176 (can’t found a way to mirror .pdf files without loading them on my own blog, mea culpa)
Recently have read an interview with volunteer (militiaman) who supported pro-Russian separatists on Ukrainian south-east territories known as Donbass. Politics aside, interesting notes on communications. Sorry for my poor transcription (even with gugl help).
– Comms were the problem?
– In our unit comms were very good. Nearly every fighter had radio, barely there was just no-go to the operations without them. 95% of personnel were provided with comms, surely.
– What’s the radios?
– I’m not expert in them. Were good, “Kenvods”. Were bad. TKF, i guess.
– That is, radios were household and had not a secure communication channel?
– Have you a case to come across ukrainian transmissions on-the-air?
– We had not, but we had a branch wich intentionally listened to “ukrops”* dialogues through the open channels. The exactly same radios were on the opposite side, after all.
– As a secure communication channel was not existed, do yourselves used coded words during the conversations, so enemy do not understand the content?
– Before the operation of Debaltsevo we still tried to encrypt, but then battle broke out – dropped attempts. Well, maybe changed the names of settlements and that’s all. People just could be confused, they often even forgot a pass-word, and if to still play on air, then oops …
* Ukrop – hostile definition of Ukrainian. Ukrops – plural form.
My interest on this topic increases more and more as Interesting Times are approaching. That is the task? Take group of enthusiastic dumb diletants, give them weapons and
bless to die needlessly an advice to survive the fight. Give them a bunch of baofengs or even a bubblepack radios and hope they will not surrender their intentions with careless talk on-air. Some means to protect communications are easily found as “coded matrix block by Ssg Donald “Mumbo” Mumm”, authentification tables in Larsen’s “Light Infantry Tactics: For Small Teams” (2005), SLIDEX examples (and BATCO) and Russian TDR-84 example. But that is the effect of best weapon which is not used? It’s zero. Then coded table is not used due to laziness and incomprehension, comms are vulnerable. Check Citizen Militem (link above) for details.
Is there a way to make using coded tables easier and more natural? Besides obvious training, training and training? My suggestions:
– templates, accessible and comprehensible; list of terms to be included, list of complex phrases to be put in one cell of table, recommendations of table formation (empty cells), transmission making (fixed length);
– clear marking of table cells; turmoil hinders to estimate that cell in the column D row 3 is cell D-3, but type the denotation D-3 in the cell D-3, and it will ease mental stress while carrying encrypted comms under pressure, with incoming direct and indirect fire.