Ukrainian comms between infantry and artillery

It becomes less funny, more boring and unbelievably stupid. So I totally disagree with Ncscout in the point, that Donbass conflict is an example of how real doings is done. It’s an example of how absurdly war can be fight – and still provide some KIA boxes.

Important remark: in the current post-USSR lexis, ‘volunteer’ is civil activist, non-combatant, providing logistic (and social) support for poor-supplied armed forces. Those forces can be army units (also marine. airborne and so on), national guard units, Interior Ministry (police, not patrolmen, but army-like) units, and – volunteer combat units, later attached to army and police, but previously relatively independent, that fact allowed speculations about private armies etc.

gifts to the war – toys and body bags (Diana Makarova fund)

Source: http://twower.livejournal.com/1918092.html / https://archive.is/Os08e

…near Debaltsevo calls for artillery support come through one civil volunteer, inter alia:

Of special note is quite surprising form of the artillery control, generated by this war. [I] seriously contend, that there were no way to call for heavy fire on the target of special importance, recognized with a high degree of certainty, through the headquarters of the sector. Head of sector artillery (they were changing every month and a half), did not know how to do it. But it was successfully done, and more than one time, through one “influential” in this regard, civilian volunteer! Fire of arty, subordinated to ATO command, was called and coordinated through completely civil people, using unexpected but working channels.

full http://twower.livejournal.com/1903992.html (also part of this is here: https://ironboundconcepts.wordpress.com/2016/02/17/piss-off-the-comms-we-are-at-war/ )

Piss off the comms, we are at war!

Mainly for Ncscout, also for everyone interested. Previous post here.

Funny to read about civil war on the South-East of Ukraine. It is NOT funny war (as any war), but it is funny as hell then it comes to “strange” cases and tendencies.

First quote from pro-Kiev forces AAR: http://twower.livejournal.com/1903992.html

Sadly, arty recon and main comms came with the next echelon, and 25st btn entered the combat still not established comms and interaction with the BrAG-128 group, and there were no qualified forward observers in the leading combat formations.

Cooperation model between sector artillery and units with no own arty was unacceptable and simply terrible. If GS RF (Russian Federation General Staff – IBC) developed this model for the UAF (Ukrainian Armed Forces – IBC), it can not be worst. The nature and coordinates of targets, as well as following adjustments (if any) came from the infantry commanders mobilized en masse of civilians who have only a sketchy understanding of these processes. This information is passed from the supporting point commander to the headquarters of his battalion and from there to the sector headquarters, where transferred to the headquarters of the artillery sector, which, in turn, passed it, at best, on the OP (firing position) of subordinate sector howitzer battery from the 55th brigade, at worst – to the headquarters of the artillery ATO, which descends to its firing position some of their batteries, respectively, not bypassing the staffs of brigades and divisions! It was and remains uniform diversion! Attempts to break this vicious practice by the officers who understand the full absurdity of this “interaction”, were futile.

And interview with separatist volunteer: http://twower.livejournal.com/1904970.html

– What radios were used?

– There were portable “159th”, “Kenwood”. It does not matter what, ukrops listened for all of them.

– Were mobile phones used for communication?

– Of course. I always told everyone: use. Just go to the “Kyivstar” (cellular service operator – IBC). Almost all ukrops sit on “Kyivstar”. Well, you can still assume that 25 folks with phones may be subject of direction-finding in the fields and hit by arty, but in the settlements, you can safely use phone. What’s the difference: it is a peaceful man with a phone or militia? Or even ukrop’s agents are speaking by phone? I have never seen someone hit by arty after the phone call.

– While communicating, do you tried to encrypt information, used the code words?

– It does not bring any sense. Because all of this must be coordinated: not 1-2 people, but a full chain. And when it’s all going transient, then it makes no sense. Easier to do is turn on the phone and make a call.

– Did you try intentionally to listen Ukrainian transmissions?

– No. What for? Only first [in the initial period of war – note] they spoke by walkie-talkies who will go where. And then wised up and stopped this.

Code tables using for the ignorant stupid lazy people

In the context of: radios use in Oregon standoff; 3% communications guru Sparks31 abdication; and Ncscouts’ Echoes of Chechnya inspiration.
Links to look at:
http://radiofreeq.wordpress.com/2016/01/19/militia-radio-frequencies/ / https://archive.is/KclMO
http://sparks31signalcorps.wordpress.com/2016/01/17/closing-down/ / https://archive.is/Umwhh
http://brushbeater.wordpress.com/2015/12/01/echoes-of-chechnya/ / https://archive.is/yTPUH
http://citizenmilitem.com/?page_id=176 (can’t found a way to mirror .pdf files without loading them on my own blog, mea culpa)

Recently have read an interview with volunteer (militiaman) who supported pro-Russian separatists on Ukrainian south-east territories known as Donbass. Politics aside, interesting notes on communications. Sorry for my poor transcription (even with gugl help).

– Comms were the problem?

– In our unit comms were very good. Nearly every fighter had radio, barely there was just no-go to the operations without them. 95% of personnel were provided with comms, surely.

– What’s the radios?

– I’m not expert in them. Were good, “Kenvods”. Were bad. TKF, i guess.

– That is, radios were household and had not a secure communication channel?